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Suboptimal international equity portfolio diversification and stock market development 
 
 
 
Abstract This paper examines whether the widely reported phenomena of home and foreign 
biases (i.e. suboptimal international equity portfolio diversification) hold any ramifications for 
the development of stock markets. The results, analysed using macro- and micro-level data, 
support the view that stock markets that are characterised by a higher degree of home bias are 
associated with lower levels of development. On the other hand, markets where foreign 
investors show a higher degree of allocation preference, relative to the prescribed benchmark 
(foreign bias), are found to be more developed. The results, which are robust to the use of shock 
based identification strategy, indicate that policy measures that promote optimal international 
equity portfolio diversification could be crucial in developing the depth and breadth of 
domestic stock markets.  
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1 Introduction 
Despite the benefits of international portfolio diversifications (see Grubel 1968; De Roon et al. 
2001; Chiou and Lee 2013; Yu et al. 2017), it is well established that investors do not exploit 
such opportunities but sub-optimally allocate funds across countries (see Cooper at al. 2012)1. 
This sub-optimality in international equity portfolio diversification (SIEPD) encompasses the 
phenomena of both home and foreign biases2 relative to the prediction of the International 
Capital Asset Pricing Model3 (also see Wu & Gau, 2017 and Broihanne et al, 2016). The 
primary focus of the existing literature on international equity portfolio diversification has been 
to explain the phenomena of home and foreign biases.4 However, the possible implications of 
such suboptimal diversification (i.e. home and foreign biases) have remained largely 
unexplored. This study contributes by investigating whether the widely reported home and 
foreign biases have ramifications for the development of stock markets. With respect to 
economic justifications, SIEPD is likely to influence the development of stock markets through 
two complementary channels.  
The first channel through which SIEPD may affect the development of stock markets 
stresses the implications of restricted outbound investments by domestic investors relative to 
the benchmark, i.e. the effect of home bias. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and Lau et al. (2010) 
argue that relatively higher domestic portfolio investments, i.e. higher degree of home bias, 
keep the domestic cost of capital higher as risks are largely shared only among domestic 
investors and local investors are not diversified enough to reduce the country-specific risk. 
                                                          
1 For time varying diversification effects see Chiou and Lee (2013) and for benefits from developing markets; 
perspective see Chiou & Boasson (2015). 
2 Home bias indicates that local investors hold a significantly higher percentage of domestic securities in their 
portfolios relative to the theoretical prescription of the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 
benchmark. Correspondingly, foreign bias relates to the tendency of foreign investors to over or under weight 
foreign markets compared to the ICAPM benchmark. For further details on the differences between home and 
foreign bias, see Chan et al. (2005).  
3 See Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) for a detailed discussion on how the ICAPM is used to derive the value based 
international portfolio allocation. 
4 See Kwabi et al., (2018) for recent evidence and Cooper et al. (2012) for an extensive review. 
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Higher cost of capital deters real investments and retards the growth of stock markets with 
fewer security issuances, a concentrated industrial base, and inefficient pricing. In a nutshell, 
higher domestic portfolio investments, i.e. sub-optimally lower international allocations, 
dissuade development of the stock markets while optimal international allocations promote 
such development. 
The second channel through which SIEPD influences stock market development is 
through the effect of financial globalization, which is defined as the degree of trading by foreign 
investors in the domestic markets (see Stulz 2005). Financial globalization is also directly 
related to the varying level of foreign bias manifested by foreign investors, i.e. higher financial 
globalization implies a higher degree of foreign bias and thus, greater preference of foreign 
investors to hold host market’s equities (see Lau et al. 2010). Errunza (2001) documents that 
with increased investments in the host market, foreign portfolio investors demand prompt and 
quality information, a higher degree of minority shareholder protection, and adequate and 
timely regulations that govern market and trading activities. The participation of foreign 
investors infuses confidence among the local investors to trade nationally and internationally, 
driving up the level of competition in domestic markets. With the increased presence of foreign 
investors, the trading activities of domestic investors also grow, helping the market to become 
more liquid, cost-effective and price efficient. Furthermore, foreign investors also provide 
significant lobbying power for the development of new institutions and services, encourage the 
adaptation of contemporary trading technology, and pressurize the authorities into training the 
local workforce. These demands help in the deepening of the financial markets. 
Offering similar arguments, Henry (2000) claims that foreign investors are able to 
compel local firms to produce more timely and accurate forecasts than local analysts. This 
helps in enhancing the pricing efficiency of the market because foreign investors may compel 
the management to disclose price-sensitive information in a timely manner, mitigating the 
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possibility of insider trading and information uncertainty faced by liquidity traders. Stulz 
(1999) also posits that with greater firm disclosure, induced by growing foreign investors and 
foreign listing of domestic firms, market makers and investors (domestic and foreign) who do 
not have access to inside information, worry less about being exploited by insiders when they 
trade. Such assurances increase the number and diversity of investors and market markers 
leading to greater liquidity and lower bid-ask spread. Thus, ceteris paribus, countries that can 
attract higher levels of foreign portfolio investments (suggesting lower home and higher 
foreign biases) should experience a positive impact on the development of the domestic stock 
market (see Errunza, 2001). 
The above reasoning suggests that optimal international diversification by domestic and 
foreign investors should have a positive effect on the development of local stock markets. 
However, Bekaert and Harvey (2003) note that despite the removal of explicit barriers leading 
to formal liberalization of equity markets, the observed gains are not as high as expected. The 
inadequate benefits have been attributed to the presence of implicit or indirect barriers5 to 
international investments, both in developed and, relatively more so, in emerging markets. 
These implicit hurdles deter potential investors from optimally diversifying their portfolios, 
leading to home and foreign biases (see Bekaert and Wang 2010). For example, Mishra (2011) 
finds that real exchange rate volatility influences equity home bias in Australia. A recent work 
by Wu and Gau (2017) suggests that poor quality information amongst domestic investors 
increases equity home bias.  
The prevalence of home bias inhibits financial globalization and increases cost of capital 
as risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors is inhibited, which impedes the 
reduction of country systematic risk (see Kim et al. 2015 and Lau et al. 2010). Higher home 
                                                          
5 Examples of such barriers include weak investor protection, poor accounting standards, higher trading costs, and 
lower market liquidity etc. (see Bekaert and Harvey 2003). 
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bias, i.e. lower financial globalization, also retards the development of factor productivity, 
including financial deepening6 of the capital market. Although there have been studies on the 
implications of SIEPD on cost of capital, we extend the literature by investigating whether 
variations observed in home and foreign biases can, in part, explain the heterogeneous 
development of stock markets around the world.  
We investigate the relation between SIEPD and stock market development using standard 
measures of home and foreign biases and four different proxies of stock market development. 
Two key findings emerge from a battery of empirical estimations, including the use of an 
exogenous shock provided by the 2007 global financial crises as an identification strategy. 
First, stock markets that are characterised by lower home bias are larger, more diversified, 
liquid, and have relatively lower transaction costs. The results of shock based analysis suggest 
that a one percentage point reduction in home bias (i.e. higher degree of international 
diversification), on average, increases the size of the local stock market (relative to the size of 
the economy) by nearly 0.2%. Similarly, a one percentage point reduction in home bias leads 
to an increase in turnover (market liquidity) by at least 0.2% and a decrease in average trading 
cost by 0.2%.7 The evidence further shows that a higher degree of foreign bias (i.e. the tendency 
to favour some stock markets relative to others by foreign investors) leads to larger, more 
diversified, liquid, and cost-effective stock markets. 
Second, the results suggest that the evidence of suboptimal international portfolio 
diversification is not only observed in aggregated macro-level data used in existing literature 
                                                          
6 The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) reports that the interplay between financial deepening and financial 
globalization is still an uncharted domain in the academic literature. The report notes that foreign investors provide 
capital, expertise and competition, which could spur financial deepening of the local market, particularly in 
countries with weaker financial development. It argues that the presence of foreign investors enhances the 
domestic market, beyond the metric of mere size, by not only infusing the much needed capital for investment 
and growth but also by promoting competition, raising the bar of corporate governance and transparency , and 
bringing the domestic firms to the international financial markets. 
7 These economic magnitudes are the first estimates available in the literature. As with any observation-based 
regression study that generates significant challenge of establishing credible causality (including quasi-
experimental designs), these estimates are also subject to empirical assumptions and limited to our data set and 
sample period. Therefore, they should be viewed as indicators of the relation and used with due caution.  
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(e.g. Chan et al. 2005; Bekaert and Wang 2010), but is also prevalent in the micro-level global 
equity funds whose primary objective is to undertake optimal global diversification. This 
suggests that suboptimal international diversification is prevalent, even among the most 
sophisticated global fund managers.  
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, despite several studies offering 
explanations of the various risk exposures of international investments (Phengpis and Swanson 
2011; Clark and Kassimatis 2013) that potentially lead to home and foreign biases (see Mishra 
2011; Cooper et al. 2012), there is a paucity of studies that examine the consequences of home 
and foreign biases. The only study that is remotely related to ours is that of Lau et al. (2010), 
who demonstrate the implications of SIEPD on cost of capital. We extend this strand of 
literature by investigating the ramifications of home and foreign biases on the development of 
stock markets.8  Second, this study also adds to the debate on the beneficial effects of 
international financial integration on factor productivity. For example, Bekaert et al. (2011) 
argue that the collateral benefits of financial integration on factor productivity, through 
increased international portfolio investments, may be more pivotal for the long-term economic 
welfare than the expected short-term growth spurt. Thus, we take this debate a step forward by 
providing evidence consistent with the economic justification that optimal diversification of 
equity portfolios, which supports greater global financial integration of the market, promotes 
the development of stock markets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
construction of home and foreign bias measures. Section 3 includes the discussion on empirical 
results and section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                          
8 Our study also differs from those observing changes in market development measures post financial 
liberalization. Instead of investigating the changes post liberalization we investigate the implications of home and 
foreign bias puzzles on stock market development. 
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2 Data 
To test the implications of home and foreign biases on the development of domestic stock 
markets, three proxies of home and foreign bias (i.e. measures of IEPD) and four proxies of 
stock market development are used. Drawing on the literature, we also include a number of 
control variables that could potentially explain the cross-sectional and temporal variations in 
stock market development. 
2.1 Measures of home and foreign bias 
The home and foreign bias measures are based on the simple Markowitz portfolio model in 
international settings, as used extensively in the literature (Cooper and Kaplanis 1986; Ahearne 
et al. 2004; Chan et al. 2005). Accordingly, we employ three data sets to generate a measure of 
home bias and two measures of foreign bias in international equity portfolio diversification. 
First, we use the standard aggregate country level cross-country equity portfolio holding (in 
USD millions) obtained from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The CPIS has data on stocks of cross-border holdings of 
equities for 76 participating countries.9  We use the annual cross-country portfolio holdings for 
the period of 2001-2014 to construct proxy measures of equity home bias (CPIS_HB) and 
equity foreign bias (CPIS_FB), as described in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. Dictated by the 
availability of data, we use 44 out of the 45 countries included in the highly investable Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country Index.10 
Second, we use fund level, country allocation data from Emerging Portfolio Fund 
Research (EPFR) to measure the global fund’s foreign bias (GF_FB).11 EPFR avails asset 
                                                          
9 A detailed description of this data set can be found in Bekaert and Wang (2010). 
10 The total investments of source and host countries comprise over 95% of the total assets and liabilities  holdings 
respectively reported by CPIS. 
11 The EPFR is used by existing researchers to address a number of different issues (see Gelos and Wei 2005; 
Jotikasthira et al. 2012).  
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allocation data trading in traditional and alternative funds domiciled globally. The aim of the 
country allocations for the global funds is to provide a complete and comprehensive picture of 
fund managers’ allocations driving global markets. For each year, we use the average of 12 
months’ country allocations of 122 global equity funds, domiciled across nine countries. The 
total size of all the funds is approximately US$120 billion. Since these are purely global funds, 
we expect the foreign bias to be minimal compared to the CPIS aggregate data, which include 
various (undisclosed) funds’ types. To maintain consistency with the CPIS data, the sample 
period of EPFR data is also 2001-2014.12  Finally, for the construction of the ICAPM 
benchmark allocation, we use the country level equity market capitalization of S&P/IFC 
obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank.   
 
2.1.1 Equity home bias 
Equity home bias implies the degree to which domestic investors overweight their domestic 
portfolio investments relative to the prescription of the ICAPM benchmark. Following the 
literature (see Cooper and Kaplanis 1986; Ahearne et al. 2004 and Chan et al. 2005) we define 
equity home bias (𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡)
13 as: 
where 𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑡 , as defined in equation (2), shows domestic investors’ allocations in their home 
equity market of country 𝑗 (i.e. investors based in country j investing in their country j) at time 
t.  
                                                          
12 Further, since the funds are domiciled in nine countries, we are unable to construct a robust measure of home 
bias, which is restricted by the smaller number of observations for our empirical analysis (90 observations only).  
13 A zero 𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡 would indicate that investors have no bias towards their home market, while positive values show 
the presence of home bias. 
 𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡 = log (
𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑡
𝑊𝑗𝑡
∗ )  
(1)  
 𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑡 =
ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑡
 (2)  
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where ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡 is the stockholdings of domestic investors (based in country j) in their home market 
j and 𝐺𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑡 is the global holdings of domestic investors at time t across all 44 countries, 
including the home market. It is worth noting that CPIS only reports the bilateral foreign equity 
portfolio holdings with no investments in domestic markets for each host country j. Following 
the existing literature (Fidora et al. 2007), domestic portfolio holdings (ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡) is: 
where 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the market capitalization of equities issued in country j (obtained from the WDI) 
and 𝐹𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡,   𝑖≠𝑗 is the holdings of all equities of country j by foreign investors domiciled in 
country i (obtained from CPIS). The 𝐺𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑡 is thus measured as: 
where 𝐹𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the holdings of foreign securities (i) by investors domiciled in country j at time 
t.  Finally, the term 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ , of equation (1), as defined in equation (5), is the ICAPM world 
benchmark allocation for country j at time t, which is the same for all investors in all countries 
(see Cooper and Kaplanis 1986 and Chan et al. 2005 for the modelling of benchmark 
allocation). 
As 𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡 is constructed using CPIS data, we denote this variable by CPIS_HB in our analysis. 
 
2.1.2 Equity Foreign bias 
Relative to the ICAPM prediction, equity foreign bias implies a disproportionate allocation of 
funds of investors domiciled in country i to the securities of (foreign) countries j. Following 
Chan et al. (2005) we compute equity foreign bias (𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡) as in equation (6): 
 ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡 – ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡,   𝑖≠𝑗
43
𝑖=1  (3)  
 𝐺𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑡 = ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝐹𝑃𝐻𝑗𝑖𝑡,   𝑗≠𝑖
43
𝑘=1
 (4)  
 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡
44
𝑗=1
 (5)  
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where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the allocation of country i’s investors in equities of firms based in country j at 
time t. It is defined as:  
where  ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes country 𝑖’s investors’ holdings of equities in a foreign country 𝑗 at time t. 
𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗  , as defined in equation (5), is the ICAPM benchmark allocation for investing in country j 
for time t. 
For each pair of countries (i.e. i & j) equity foreign bias could be either positive, where 
foreign investors (in country i) overweight another equity market (j) more than that suggested 
by the implied global weight (𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ ), or negative, where foreign investors underweight their 
investment away from the implied global weight.14 For regression analysis we take the average 
equity foreign bias (𝐴𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡) exhibited by all source countries’ investors (i=1…..n) for country 
j for each period t as shown in equation (8): 
The measures of foreign bias based on CPIS-IMF and EPFR Global Funds’ data are 
denoted as 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝐵 and 𝐺𝐹_𝐹𝐵 respectively. The number of source countries, i.e. n, for 
CPIS_FB is 43 (i.e. the same as the host countries, excluding the country for which foreign 
bias is measured, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ) and the n for the GF_FB, i.e. the number of funds exhibiting foreign 
bias for each country, is 121, excluding the fund if its country of domicile is the same as the 
country of allocation, i.e. 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
 
                                                          
14 Note, on aggregate the foreign bias should be negative for each country (j) which exhibits home bias. However, 
given the fact that CPIS does not report the holding for all countries in the world, on average, the foreign bias 
could be positive or negative. Such figures are also reported in the existing literature (see Chan et al. 2005).  
 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 = log (
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑊𝑗𝑡
∗ )  
(6)  
 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
∑ ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
43
𝑗=1
      (7)  
 𝐴𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
 (8)  
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2.2 Stock market development measures 
We employ four measures of stock market development that are commonly used in the 
literature (see Levine and Zervos 1996; Chan et al. 2005). The measures are: (a) market 
capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, (b) equity value traded to GDP ratio, (c) 
turnover ratio (value traded to market capitalization), and (d) a direct measure of transactions 
costs. The first measure “market capitalization as a percentage of GDP” (MGDP) reflects the 
size and importance of the stock market relative to the economy and is widely used as a proxy 
of stock market development. Levine and Zervos (1996) document that developed stock 
markets are not only bigger in size but are also better at mobilizing capital and diversifying 
risk. Both market capitalization and GDP of the sample countries are obtained from the WDI 
of the World Bank.  
The second measure of stock market development is “trading volume as a percentage of 
GDP” (TRGDP). This is also known as the value traded ratio. Trading volume is the total value 
of stocks traded during the year. TRGDP reflects the depth of market activity, i.e. market 
liquidity relative to the economy. It complements the MGDP measure as bigger markets may 
not necessarily be the most active markets. The data on trading volume were also sourced from 
the WDI of the World Bank.  
The third measure of stock market development is “turnover ratio” (TURN) which is 
defined as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization. Whilst TRGDP 
reflects market liquidity relative to the size of the economy, TURN reflects the significance of 
market liquidity relative to the size of the stock market. Further, turnover ratios are also shown 
to be inversely related to the cost of equity trading, i.e. higher turnover leads to lower trading 
costs. Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) document that market turnover not only indicates liquidity 
but also measures the rate at which information arrives in the market that instigates trades. 
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Consequently, the turnover ratio indicates the sophistication of market microstructure and 
market liquidity, trading costs, and efficiency.  
Both measures of liquidity (TRGDP and TURN) are the developments in market 
microstructure and are indirect measures of transaction costs. Thus, we also incorporate a direct 
measure of transaction costs (TRCOST). The latter reflects the depth of market liquidity more 
directly, showing how costly it is to undertake trade in a particular market. Following Chan et 
al. (2005), we use a composite measure of market level transaction costs (in basis points) 
incorporating three different sub-components of costs related to an average equity trade.15 
These country level, annual trading costs figures are estimated and maintained by 
Elkins/McSherry (E/M) and are reported in the yearly global stock market fact book of 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P). E/M analyses the global trading costs for 150 global institutions 
(pension funds, investment managers, banks and brokers) providing estimates of the country 
level transaction cost for international investors. E/M’s estimates of market level transaction 
cost, based on an average transaction in USD, are generated by aggregating three sub-
components: commissions, fees and market impact. Commissions consist of costs incurred by 
investors for accessing brokerage research facilities and services. Investors also pay fees for 
accessing extra services including settlement costs. The S&P global stock market fact book 
(2007) defines market impact as the difference between the price at which a trade is executed 
and the average of stocks’ high, low, opening and closing prices during the trade. It is the 
average cost of trade versus the average price and is measured as the change in price per share 
divided by the volume of trade. 
 
 
                                                          
15 These are the only aggregate country level proxies for average transaction cost measures sourced from the 
literature and are available for country level studies in the panel data framework. 
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2.3 Control variables 
To isolate the implications of home and foreign biases on stock market development, we 
control for the possible effects of several other factors that are known to influence the 
development of stock markets. Earlier studies16 show that market development is associated 
with the degree of foreign direct investments, domestic savings, banks’ credit to the private 
sector, exchange rate exposure, expected inflation, interest rate, historical stock market 
performance, degree of trade openness, market capitalization, rule of law, legal origin, financial 
policy risk, and corruption. In the equations, all time varying control variables, discussed 
below, enter with a one-year lag. 
Foreign investors are more likely to make direct investments in countries where stock 
markets are subject to lower controls and exhibit higher liquidity (see Claessens et al. 2006). 
Therefore, annual foreign direct investment (FDIS) proxies the effect of the stock of foreign 
direct investments on the stock market development of a country. We measure FDIS as year-
end stock of foreign direct investments scaled by GDP.17 Domestic savings (Sav) is the 
mobilization of domestic financial resources on investments leading to the development of 
stock markets. We measure Sav as the natural logarithm of the country’s gross domestic savings 
(as a % of GDP).  Commercial banks’ credit to the private sector (PCred)18 reflects the 
development of the credit market (see Bekaert et al. 2005 which further influences the 
development of the stock market. We calculate PCred as the log of domestic credit to the 
private sector, as a percentage of GDP. The data are obtained from the WDI.  
Boyd et al. (2001), among others, demonstrate that macroeconomic stability is positively 
related to the development of the stock market. We include three variables to control the degree 
                                                          
16 See, for instance, Claessens et al. (2006). 
17 Foreign direct investments exclude equity portfolio investment. 
18 Credits to the private sector include commercial banks’ short- and long-term loans, purchase of non-equity 
securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment provided to the private 
sector. 
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of macroeconomic stability: real interest rate (Int), inflation rate (Infl) and exchange rate 
exposure (Exch). Data on real interest rate and inflation are obtained from the WDI. Following 
Lau et al. (2010), we construct the exchange rate risk exposure for each country as a three year 
moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change 
of the domestic currency with respect to the US dollar. Countries with a stable exchange rate 
are expected to attract more foreign equity investment which will contribute to the development 
of stock markets. The exchange rates are sourced from Thompson Reuters. 
We further use the preceding year’s market return (Retn) to control for the effects of 
momentum in stock returns. Given the evidence on the success of momentum trading strategies 
to generate excess returns, investors are likely to invest in markets when recent returns are 
higher, leading to further development of the stock market. We expect a positive relation 
between Retn and stock market development. Further, studies suggest that trade openness 
(TOPNs) affects market development as it can contribute to financial integration (see Bekaert 
and Harvey 2000). To control for its effect, we measure the degree of trade openness by the 
natural logarithm of a country’s exports and imports scaled by GDP. The data are obtained 
from WDI. 
Claessens et al. (2006) suggest that developed countries with high incomes tend to have 
deeper stock markets. Accordingly, we employ GDP Per Capita (GDPPC) to incorporate the 
effects of income on stock market development (see Wong et al., 2013). GDP per capita is 
obtained from the WDI. Earlier studies (e.g. Fama and French 1992) suggest that MKTCap has 
a positive impact on stock market development. We employ MKTCap by including the natural 
logarithm of one year lagged year-end market capitalization to control for the potential price 
effect on stock market development. GDPPC and MKTCap are sourced from WDI.   
We employ three measures to control the effects of institutional quality (see La Porta et 
al. 1998) on stock market development. The first measure is the rule of law (R_Law) index 
Commented [CT4]: 1st  
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ranging from 0 (highest potential risk) to 6 (lowest potential risk). This is obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Second, we use a dummy variable to proxy the 
common law (Legal_O) countries. The third measure we employ is ICRG’s corruption (Cor) 
index (0 indicating the highest risk of corruption and 6 being the lowest).  
Finally, we also employ the financial policy risk index (FinRisk) of the ICRG to proxy a 
country’s ability to meet its debt liability. The FinRisk index, which ranges from 0-50, is 
constructed using five potential sources of financial risk components: foreign debt as a % of 
GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as a % of total export and services, current account 
as a % of exports and services, and international liquidity. All broad country risk measures 
used in this study are the annual average based on the monthly ratings (see ICRG, 2012 for 
further details of the method of creating FinRisk).  
 
3 Empirical results 
This section starts with a brief discussion of the summary statistics of alternative measures of 
stock market development and the proxies of home and foreign biases. Subsequently, the 
results of multivariate analyses that account for the effects of several control factors are 
discussed.  
 
3.1 The sample features 
Table 1 presents key features of the four measures of stock market development (columns 2-5) 
and the three measures of SIEPD, i.e. home and foreign biases (columns 6-8). The statistics are 
reported at country level (panel A), by groups of countries based on their level of economic 
development (emerging versus developed markets,19 panel B), and the average of the top and 
bottom ten countries against the measure of home bias (CPIS_HB, panel C).  
                                                          
19 We use the Morgan Stanley Capital Investment classification to identify emerging and developed markets.  
 16 
 
………......Insert Table 1 about here.............. 
Among the 44 sample countries, 21 are emerging and 23 are developed markets (Table 
1, panel A). Not surprisingly, the top 10 countries ranked by stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio (MGDP) are developed (Hong Kong, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, France and Finland). On the other hand, the bottom 
10 positions are mostly held by emerging markets (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, Philippines, Indonesia and Argentina). A similar picture 
emerges when we compare the top and bottom ten countries by TRGDP and TURN.20 The top 
ten nations with the lowest transaction costs (TRCOST) are developed markets (Japan, United 
States, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy and Norway) and 
those with the highest transaction costs are emerging markets (Philippines, Romania, Peru, 
South Africa, Egypt, Argentina, Indonesia, Bulgaria, India and Czech Republic). The ranking 
of countries by all four measures of stock market development convincingly supports the view 
that developed markets are larger, diversified, liquid and have lower transaction costs.  
Columns 5-7 of Table 1 (panel B) provide the analysis of the three different measures of 
SIEPD – a measure of home bias (CPIS_HB) and two measures of foreign bias (CPIS_FB and 
GF_FB). As in the case of stock market development, the top ten countries that exhibit least 
home bias (i.e. CPIS_HB) are primarily the developed ones (United States, Japan, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, France, Canada, Ireland, Italy and Hong Kong). The bottom 
ten positions (i.e. highest home bias) are predominantly occupied by emerging markets 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Peru, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Argentina, Czech Republic, Malaysia 
and Philippines). Similarly, the top ten positions in foreign bias (CPIS_FB) are occupied by 
the developed countries, primarily European, possibly caused by being members of the same 
                                                          
20 The top ten countries ranked by TRGDP are Hong Kong, United States, Switzerland, United Kingdom, South 
Korea, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, and Finland while the bottom ten countries are Romania, Argentina, 
Peru, Bulgaria, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Czech Republic, Indonesia and Chile.   
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economic union where cross-country investment is more easily attainable. The GF_FB 
measure of foreign bias also presents a similar picture with developed markets being more 
favoured by international investors compared to emerging markets.  
The above patterns of home and foreign biases are consistent with the evidence reported 
by earlier studies (e.g. Chan et al. 2005; Bekaert and Wang 2010). However, most of the 
existing studies that infer phenomena of suboptimal international diversification are based on 
macro-level data. The evidence from micro-level data (i.e. GF_FB in col 8) suggests that such 
suboptimal investment characteristics are also prevalent in the micro-level global equity funds 
whose primary objective is to undertake global diversification optimally. This signifies that the 
manifestation of suboptimal international diversification is also ubiquitous, even among the 
most sophisticated global fund managers. Overall, the individual country level analysis 
indicates that countries with a higher stock market development are also associated with a 
lower degree of home bias and a higher degree of foreign bias.  
To further examine the above evidence of initial country level analysis, we split the 
sample countries into developed and emerging markets and compare the SIEPD and stock 
market development measures. The evidence from CPIS_HB (Panel B) shows that the level of 
home bias in developed countries (3.32) is much lower than that in emerging nations (6.04). 
Similarly, both measures of foreign bias suggest a much higher bias in developed markets 
(CPIS_FB = 0.37 and GF_FB = -0.09) compared to those in emerging markets (CPIS_FB = -
1.64 and GF_FB = -2.15). All four measures of stock market development (MGDP = 168.13, 
TRGDP = 191.72, TURN = 160.56 and TRCOST = 26.31) reveal evidence of higher level stock 
market development in developed countries compared to emerging countries (MGDP = 27.52, 
TRGDP = 9.12, TURN = 22.70 and TRCOST = 67.80).   
Panel C of Table 1 reveals a similar picture of home (CPIS_HB) and foreign biases 
(CPIS_FB and GF_FB) among the top/bottom nations.  The average level of home bias of the 
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ten countries with the least home bias is only 2.29 while it is 7.15 for the ten countries with the 
highest home bias. Similarly, there is a substantial difference in the average foreign biases of 
the two (top and bottom) groups of ten countries (CPIS_FB: 0.72 vs. -2.77, and GF_FB: 0.28 
vs. -2.78). These statistics, combined with the measures of IEPD biases and stock market 
development, show that the top ten countries reflect a much higher level of stock market 
development compared to the bottom ten emerging markets. 
The analysis of summary statistics on stock market development and home and foreign 
biases in IEPD imparts strong signals that countries with lower home bias are favoured more 
by foreign investors and thus seem to have more developed stock markets. This also suggests 
that countries where domestic (foreign) investors exhibit lower (higher) home biases (i.e. 
foreign bias) experience more developed stock markets, which offers support to our initial 
prediction that nations with higher home bias and lower foreign bias are associated with lower 
stock market development.  
Univariate analysis by the control variables21 shows that, on average, the stock markets 
of developed countries, relative to those of emerging markets, experience lower levels of 
exchange rate volatility, real interest rate, inflation, and corruption. On the other hand, 
developed nations are associated with higher openness in trade, higher FDIS, market 
capitalization, per capita GDP, and banks’ credit to private sector relative to GDP.  
 
3.2 Multivariate analysis 
The univariate analysis discussed above provides clear indication of a negative (positive) 
relation between home bias (foreign bias) and stock market development. The reliability of the 
observed relation, however, cannot be established without controlling for the effects of other 
factors that are known to help/hinder the development of stock markets. Using multivariate 
                                                          
21 For the sake brevity, the table is not reported but can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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regression analysis, this section further examines whether the cross-sectional and temporal 
differences in home and foreign biases can explain the variations in the development of stock 
markets after accounting for the effects of other factors. Throughout the analysis we employ 
panel regressions with country and year fixed effects and the standard errors are double 
clustered at country and year level (Petersen 2009). We address the issue of endogeneity by 
exploiting an exogenous shock accorded by the 2007 global financial crises.  
3.2.1 Home bias and stock market development 
To examine the possible implications of home bias on stock market development, we regressed 
a measure of stock market development against a set of explanatory variables including the 
measure of home bias (equation 9) in an OLS framework. We estimate four different 
specifications of equation (9) whereby in each specification the dependent variable is an 
alternative measure of stock market development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡) for country j in year t. They are 
MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST, as defined and discussed in section 2. The key 
explanatory variable of interest in all four specifications is home bias (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡−1) of country 
j in year t-1. A one period lagged measure of home bias is applied to mitigate the possibility of 
endogeneity arising from reverse causation.22 All specifications include the control variables 
discussed in section 2 and capture country fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡).  The 
results are reported in Table 2. 
The coefficients of the equity home bias (CPIS_HB) in models 1 to 3 (Table 2), bear the 
expected and statistically significant negative sign, in relation to the three stock market 
development measures (MGDP, TRGDP and TURN respectively). The estimates support the 
view that home bias in investors’ equity portfolios leads to a lower development of local stock 
                                                          
22 We address the issue of endogeneity later, in section 3.3. 
 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝟐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 (9)  
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markets. The positive and significant coefficient of CPIS_HB on TRCOST (model 4) confirms 
that markets with higher home biases are associated with higher transactions costs (i.e. lower 
stock market development). The estimates further suggest that, on average, a one percentage 
point increase in home bias reduces the size of the stock market by 0.293% of GDP (model 1), 
market liquidity by 0.688% (model 2), and turnover by 0.424% (model 3) while it leads to an 
increase in transactions cost by 0.166% (model 4).23 Overall, the estimates support the view 
that equity home bias is detrimental to the development of stock markets and lends empirical 
support to the theoretical conjecture implied by Errunza (2001) and Lau et al. (2010), as 
discussed in the introduction section of this paper. 
Overinvestment in the domestic stock market may lead to a high possibility of 
expropriation of shareholders’ wealth by insiders and government, whereby large corporate 
insiders develop close ties and connive with the state to expropriate minorities (Firth et al. 
2008). Such a perceived environment is likely to reduce the confidence and participation level 
of the domestic investors, thus inhibiting the financial deepening of the domestic capital 
market.  
………......Insert Table 2 about here.............. 
3.2.2 Foreign bias and stock market development 
To examine the impact of foreign bias on stock market development, we estimate four 
specifications of equation (10). In each of the four specifications (models 1-4), the dependent 
variable is one of the four measures of stock market development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡) for country j in year 
t (i.e. MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST). The key explanatory variable of interest is the 
foreign bias (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1) of country j in year t-1. All specifications include the control 
                                                          
23 Naturally, as with any empirical investigation using non-experimental data, these estimates are subject to 
empirical assumptions and limited to our data set and sample period. 
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variables discussed in section 2, country fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) and the year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). The 
results are reported in Table 3. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of foreign bias (CPIS_FB) on three 
measures of stock market development (MGDP, TRGDP, TURN), reported in models 1-3, 
provide convincing evidence that higher foreign bias leads to more developed stock markets.  
Similarly, the observed significant and negative coefficient of foreign bias (CPIS_FB) on 
transactions cost (TRCOST) (model 4) implies that foreign investors’ participation in a stock 
market helps in reducing transaction costs. Overall, these estimates suggest that countries that 
are able to attract more funds from foreign investors, relative to the prescribed benchmark, (i.e. 
higher foreign bias), benefit from improved local stock markets. 
………......Insert Table 3 about here.............. 
3.2.3 Fund level foreign bias and stock market development 
We further investigate whether equity foreign bias (GF_FB), measured by cross-country 
allocations of global funds (i.e. using fund level data), has a similar influence on the 
development of stock markets in host countries. Similarly to Equation (10), Equation (11) is 
estimated using four different measures of stock market development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡) and the results 
are reported in models 1 to 4 of Table 4. The key explanatory variable of interest is the global 
fund-based foreign bias (𝐺𝐹_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1) measure for country j and in year t-1. All specifications 
include control variables, discussed in section 2, country fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) and year fixed 
effects (𝛿𝑡).  
The significant positive coefficients of foreign bias (GF_FB) on the first three measures 
of stock market development (i.e. MGDP, TRGDP and TURN), reported in models 1 to 3, 
 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑗𝑡  (10)  
 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐹_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝟐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑗𝑡 (11)  
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confirm that favourable foreign bias has a significant positive effect on the development of the 
host stock market. Similarly, the significant negative coefficient of GF_FB on TRCOST (model 
4) supports the view that the participation of foreign investors can lead to lower transactions 
costs.  
Overall, the evidence from the analysis of fund level foreign bias supports our earlier 
findings that foreign equity portfolio investors contribute to enhancing the competition, market 
size, and liquidity of host stock markets. These results are consistent with the prediction of 
studies which argue that higher participation of foreign investors improves stock market 
liquidity (see Bekaert et al. 2007; Henry 2000; Gul et al. (2010)).  
………......Insert Table 4 about here.............. 
3.2.4 The roles of control variables 
The control variables that generally enter the regressions with theoretically consistent and 
statistically significant coefficients are the FDIS, growth of private sector credit (PCred), 
recent stock market returns (Ret), market capitalization (MKTCap), law and order (R_Law) and 
legal origin (Legal_O). As expected, a higher stock of foreign direct investment has a positive 
and significant influence on the development of local stock markets. Similarly, the growth in 
private sector credit (PCred) also supports the development of equity markets. The estimates 
also show that the development of the stock market is positively associated with the recent 
stock returns (Ret). As the stock markets (MKTCap) grow bigger they further drive the 
competition, diversity and liquidity of the markets and help promote the stock market. Finally, 
both measures of investor protection (R_Law and Legal_O) carry expected signs and show that 
the quality of legal institutions is imperative in the development of stock markets, and that 
countries with common law-based legal traditions are associated with higher stock market 
development. 
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3.3 Robustness check 
The evidence presented so far offers compelling evidence that equity portfolio investors’ 
allocations, relative to the theoretical yardstick, are related to the development of stock 
markets. In this section, we undertake additional estimations to ensure that the results are robust 
to alternative specifications. One of the formidable concerns in this type of analysis is the issue 
of endogeneity arising from reverse causality24 and other possible alternative explanations. 
Given the nature of our investigation, we do not have access to a feasible natural experiment. 
We instead address the issue by exploiting the 2007 global financial crises shock. We take 
advantage of the exogenous variation in SIEPD (i.e. home and foreign biases) caused by the 
global financial crises to isolate the effects of SIEPD on stock market development.  The 
exogenous shock created by the 2007 global financial crises led to severe stress in several 
financial markets, particularly for those of the developed countries. However, some markets 
were more severely affected than others. 
We classify the countries that were severely affected by the global financial crises using 
stock market development measure (market capitalization scaled by GDP, i.e. MGDP).25 We 
compute five years’ average of MGDP of pre- and post-2007 global financial crises. We then 
take the change between the after and before average MGDP figures of each country and sort 
this new variable (i.e. change in post-2007 five year average) from the lowest to the highest 
figure. Based on this change we take the first half of our sample countries with lowest change 
(i.e. highest decline in MGDP averages) as the countries most affected by the 2007 global 
financial crises (i.e. our treatment group called MAFC). The other 50% is taken as proxy of the 
least affected countries by the global financial crises (i.e. our control group called LAFC).  
Figures 1 and 2 depict the average CPIS-based home and foreign biases of the MAFC 
                                                          
24 Literature notes that stock market development itself could drive home and foreign bias  (see Chan et al. 2005). 
25 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who suggested the use of the development measure in the 
classification of the countries. 
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and LAFC countries. The figures reveal that home bias in the MAFC countries has significantly 
increased since the 2007 period compared to that in LAFC countries. In fact, the gap in home 
biases of MAFC and LAFC countries increased remarkably after 2007. Similarly, after 2007, 
foreign bias drastically decreased in the MAFC countries compared to a marginal change for 
the LAFC countries. Thus the evidence shows that home and foreign biases of the MAFC and 
LAFC countries were differentially and exogenously affected by the global financial crises.  
………......Insert Figure 1 about here.............. 
………......Insert Figure 2 about here.............. 
The divergence in the trend of home and foreign biases depicted in Figures 1 and 2 
provides us with an ideal set-up to investigate whether the differential changes have any causal 
effect on the level of stock market development in MAFC relative to LAFC countries. We use 
empirical logic similar to the difference in differences (DiD) approach exploited in natural 
experiments.  
To gain the shock based identification, we create a dummy (𝐺𝑡) that takes the value of 
one for the MAFC countries (treated group) and zero for the LAFC countries (the control 
group). Similarly, we create a post-crisis year dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) from 2008 onwards. 
Subsequently, we create an interactive variable (𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡)  by interacting the 
SIEPD variables (i.e. home and foreign bias measures) with the (𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) dummy as 
reported in equation (12).  
where 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 is one of the measures of stock market development. A statistically significant β3 
with expected sign (i.e. negative in the case of MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and positive in the case 
of TRCOST) should indicate that changes in stock market development of MAFC and LAFC 
countries are affected differently by the global financial crises that led to a significant rise (fall) 
 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽3(𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 (12)  
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in home bias (foreign bias) measures. Once again, four specifications of equation (12) are 
estimated. In each specification the dependent variable is one of the four measures of stock 
market development. We present the results of the empirical estimations in Table 5. 
………......Insert Table 5 about here.............. 
Table 5 presents the results. The DiD estimator is the coefficient (𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡). 
First, the coefficients on CPIS_HB are mainly negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level with nontrivial economic magnitude, suggesting that on average countries that were 
severely affected by the 2007 global financial crises and that experienced a higher degree of 
equity home bias had a greater decline in their stock market development measures. In terms 
of economic effect, the specification using CPIS_HB shows that on average, one percentage 
increase in home bias leads to a  of 0.21%, 0.38% and 0.19% in the MGDP, TRGDP and TRUN 
measures respectively while the TRCOST increases by 0.23%. Second, as a robustness check, 
we run the same regression on CPIS_FB and GF_FB. The coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant. The results point to higher stock market development in those countries 
that were least affected by the 2007 financial crises relative to those most affected. In a nutshell, 
these findings provide a credible indication that suboptimal international portfolio investments 
do matter for the development of stock markets. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Despite the theoretical advantages of the international equity portfolio diversifications, 
empirical literature shows that portfolio investors do not optimally diversify their investments 
internationally. Consequently, such suboptimal diversification in the home market generates 
home bias and in the foreign market breeds foreign bias. Theoretical conjectures suggest that 
the presence of such biases in investors’ diversifications should affect the development of stock 
markets in home/host countries. Drawing on robust economic rationale, we examine whether 
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the observed cross-country differences in equity portfolio investors’ home and foreign biases 
have varying impacts on the development of stock markets. 
We test our proposition by constructing standard measures of home and foreign biases 
using two sets of comprehensive data covering 44 countries that span the period from 2001 to 
2014. Using four alternative measures of country level stock market development, the evidence 
from extensive analysis, including the use of shock based exogenous variations using the 2007 
global financial crises, suggests that a higher degree of home bias adversely affects the 
development of the domestic stock market. On the other hand, greater foreign bias (i.e. the 
tendency to favour a particular foreign country relative to the benchmark) has a positive 
influence on the development of host countries’ stock markets.  
Our findings suggest that countries, particularly emerging markets that are keen to 
develop the depth and breadth of their local stock markets, should implement policy measures 
that encourage domestic investors to diversify internationally and help attract foreign investors 
to the domestic markets to reap the benefits of optimal equity portfolio diversification. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the dependent and key explanatory variables 
 
This table reports the average (over the sample period) of the four different measures of stock market development 
(𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡) i.e. MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST and the three measures of home and foreign biases i.e. for 
CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB, and GF_FB.  MGDP is market capitalization as a percentage of GDP; TRGDP is stock value 
traded as a percentage of GDP; TURN is value of stock traded as a percentage of stock market capitalization; 
TRCOST is the measure of average transaction cost in bps; CPIS_HB is equity home bias calculated as the log 
share of domestic investors’ allocations in their country's stock market capitalization to the country's world equity 
market benchmark weight; CPIS_FB is equity foreign bias for country j and is computed as the log of ratio of the 
allocations of investors in country i into equities of country j to the world equity market benchmark of country j. 
GF_FB is foreign bias measured using cross-country allocations of global equity funds. Panel A reports the 
statistics for individual countries. Panel B provides a comparative picture of the average for the emerging and 
developed markets using the Morgan Stanley Capital Investment classification. Finally, Panel C presents the 
measure for two groups of countries based on the top and bottom ten countries ranked against the CPIS -based 
home bias measure (CPIS_HB).  
 
Panel A 
Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8  
Country 
MGDP (% 
of GDP) 
TRGDP 
(% of 
GDP) 
TURN (% of 
MKTCap) 
TRCOST 
(Basis 
points) 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
 
Argentina 33.52 2.89 10.24 67.98 6.62 -0.53 -2.36  
Australia 119.48 98.97 87.47 31.31 3.44 -0.19 -0.44  
Austria 50.58 21.37 42.82 30.47 4.18 0.89 -0.48  
Belgium 63.43 31.29 49.35 28.16 3.32 0.74 -0.49  
Brazil 59.26 30.36 53.74 43.06 5.34 -2.37 -1.22  
Bulgaria 19.57 3.54 17.07 60.21 9.59 -2.11 -2.56  
Canada 116.26 88.64 79.53 30.28 2.81 -0.07 -0.64  
Chile 79.83 17.85 17.12 NA 5.33 -0.24 -2.88  
China 79.38 94.72 137.19 46.58 3.15 -2.13 -1.37  
Czech Republic 26.47 15.08 58.49 56.37 6.41 0.09 -1.96  
Denmark 63.91 52.54 83.93 32.04 4.22 0.46 -0.43  
Egypt 57.25 24.87 40.94 68.15 7.27 -1.02 -3.28  
Finland 91.53 120.91 120.33 37.72 4.15 0.34 0.26  
France 99.86 83.76 103.64 24.74 2.62 0.44 0.13  
Germany 45.28 65.91 142.91 25.65 2.19 0.55 0.08  
Greece 48.16 24.45 51.48 54.34 4.72 0.18 -0.85  
Hong Kong 447.63 433.48 92.26 39.22 2.87 0.17 0.87  
Hungary 24.02 20.14 84.06 51.24 6.98 -0.44 -1.75  
India 75.95 67.12 108.74 59.06 4.76 -4.79 -2.42  
Indonesia 32.33 16.62 57.05 65.32 6.95 -1.31 -2.18  
Ireland 40.84 23.79 53.58 31.24 2.84 1.53 -0.35  
Israel 89.22 50.55 60.86 37.36 4.68 -0.28 -0.27  
Italy 34.21 49.33 134.78 29.15 2.84 0.58 -0.06  
Japan 110.15 109.18 118.08 19.38 1.77 0.21 -0.14  
Korea 78.99 153.26 218.71 55.05 4.56 -0.72 -0.26  
Malaysia 75.23 42.37 32.89 51.21 6.21 -1.06 -2.73  
Mexico 30.44 8.21 28.42 35.71 5.35 -1.93 -1.24  
Netherlands 88.11 136.09 148.56 28.45 2.31 0.66 0.2  
New Zealand 35.75 22.14 47.55 34.58 5.77 0.18 0.84  
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Norway 56.86 67.49 119.96 30.21 3.87 0.74 -0.14  
Peru 52.42 3.24 6.75 71.24 7.63 -0.63 -2.32  
Philippines 31.46 9.81 20.71 88.02 6.26 -3.81 -1.61  
Poland 30.24 11.97 40.41 NA 5.97 -0.71 -3.27  
Portugal 39.75 27.51 66.38 31.83 5.28 0.68 -0.14  
Romania 17.04 2.03 12.49 73.12 7.64 -2.17 -1.68  
Russia 63.82 38.19 64.42 NA 4.9 -3.46 -3.16  
South Africa 77.87 106.14 49.47 68.54 4.78 -0.48 -2.65  
Spain 87.52 138.12 161.68 46.82 3.09 0.04 -0.43  
Sweden 223.47 126.97 123.61 28.6 3.75 0.27 0.09  
Switzerland 226.62 231.98 102.91 27.1 3.11 0.33 0.13  
Thailand 62.65 51.16 92.84 53.14 5.83 -0.96 -1.68  
Turkey 30.61 41.35 148.67 51.1 5.44 -3.64 -2.53  
United Kingdom 125.53 191.93 155.17 50.02 2.03 0.35 0.26  
United States 120.98 275.32 234.39 21.73 0.65 -0.07 -0.13  
 
Panel B: Averages of variables of interest by the level of development of sample countries  
MGDP TRGDP TURN TRCOST CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Developed 105.43 107.46 103.52 32.62 3.32 0.37 -0.09 
Emerging 50.20 36.32 61.92 61.24 6.04 -1.64 -2.15         
Difference 55.23 71.14 41.60 -28.62 -2.72 -1.27 -2.24         
 
Panel C: Averages of variables of interest of the top 10 and bottom 10 countries 
 MGDP TRGDP TURN TRCOST CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB         
Top10 168.13 191.72 160.56 26.31 2.29 0.72 0.28         
Bottom10 27.52 9.12 22.70 67.80 7.15 -2.77 -2.78         
Difference 140.61 182.60 137.86 41.44 -4.86 -2.05 -2.50         
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Table 2: Equity home bias and stock market development 
 
This table reports the estimates of four different regression specifications of the following general equation (9).  
 
The dependent variables in each of the four specifications are the four different measures of stock market 
development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡) which are MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST as defined in the notes to Table 1. The key 
explanatory variable, CPIS_HB, is also defined in the notes to Table 1. The control variables in all four 
specifications are FDIS (year-end stock of direct investment scale by GDP); Sav (gross domestic savings as a 
percentage of GDP); PCred (domestic credit to the private financial sector scaled by GDP); Int (annual real interest 
rate); Exch (three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly 
depreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the US dollar); Infl (one year lagged rate of inflation based 
on the consumer price index); Retn_1 (average MSCI monthly index return over the past year); TOPNS (degree 
of trade openness measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP); GDPPC 
(GDP Per Capita); MKTCap (log of country market capitalization); R_Law (law and order index of a country); 
Legal_O, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise; FinRisk (financial 
risk ); Cor (corruption level prevailing in the country). 𝛼𝑗 denotes country fixed effects and 𝛿𝑡 is year fixed effects. 
The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors double clustered at the country and year 
levels. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels.  
 
 
Model (1) 
MGDP 
Model (2) 
TRGDP 
Model (3) 
TURN 
Model (4) 
TRCOST 
 
CPIS_HB -0.293*** -0.688*** -0.424*** 0.166***  
 (-3.23) (-3.31) (-4.28) (4.81)  
FDIS 0.486*** 0.226*** 0.686*** -0.135***  
 (2.94) (3.87) (3.12) (-3.38)  
Sav 0.675** 0.603 0.146 -0.187  
 (2.12) (1.48) (0.55) (-0.93)  
PCred 0.797*** 0.675** 0.593*** -0.144  
 (2.88) (2.19) (2.79) (-1.23)  
Int -0.634*** -0.567 -0.167*** 0.397*  
 (-3.25) (-1.48) (-2.78) (1.84)  
Exch -0.296*** -0.221* -0.132 0.156  
 (-3.42) (-1.87) (-1.04) (0.44)  
Infl -0.148 -0.856 -1.012 0.183  
 (-0.61) (-0.94) (-0.66) (0.58)  
Retn_1 0.309** 0.215*** 0.254*** -0.433***  
 (2.21) (3.08) (3.57) (-2.93)  
TOPNS 0.368*** 0.570*** 0.279*** -0.186  
 (4.94) (5.86) (2.98) (-0.41)  
GDPPC 0.364** 0.492** 0.283 -0.350**  
 (2.11) (2.38) (1.32) (-2.13)  
MKTCap 0.678*** 0.133*** 0.480** -0.426**  
 (4.93) (5.26) (2.58) (-2.43)  
R_Law 0.465** 0.181*** 0.149*** -0.537***  
 (2.69) (7.65) (5.63) (-4.29)  
Legal_O 0.283*** 0.214*** 0.253 -0.211***  
 (3.31) (2.83) (0.67) (-3.02)  
FinRisk -0.148 -0.321 0.282 -0.324  
 (-0.74) (-0.78) (-0.69) (0.83)  
Cor -0.187 -0.356 -0.358 0.249**  
 (-1.24) (-0.42) (-0.42) (2.31)  
Constant 4.415*** 3.587*** 3.612*** 2.517***  
 (6.78) (3.82) (4.18) (5.96)  
Number of Observations 589 589 589 562  
Adj. R-squared 
Country effects 
0.63 
Yes 
0.72 
Yes 
0.50 
Yes 
0.60 
Yes 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
  
𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝟐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑗𝑡          (9) 
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Table 3: Equity foreign bias (CPIS) and stock market development 
 
This table reports the estimates of four different regression specifications of the following general equation (10). 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝟐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑗𝑡        (10) 
 
The dependent variables in each of the four specifications are the four different measures of stock market 
development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡), i.e. MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST respectively, as defined in the notes to Table 1. 
The key explanatory variable, CPIS_FB, is also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are 
defined in the notes to Table 2. 𝛼𝑗 denotes country fixed effects and 𝛿𝑡 is year fixed effects. The t-statistics, 
reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors double clustered at the country and year levels.  For tractable 
interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
 Model (1) 
MGDP 
Model (2) 
TRGDP 
Model (3) 
TURN 
Model (4) 
TRCOST 
CPIS_FB 0.122*** 0.266*** 0.134*** -0.125*** 
 (4.18) (4.87) (3.28) (-3.18) 
FDIS 0.180*** 0.125*** 0.137*** -0.170** 
 (2.95) (2.92) (4.69) (-2.34) 
Sav 0.878** 0.131** 0.340 -0.753 
 (2.43) (1.93) (0.94) (-0.42) 
PCred 0.762*** 0.158*** 0.586** -0.257** 
 (3.27) (3.42) (2.33) (-2.26) 
Int -0.475 -0.181** -0.227*** 0.573** 
 (-1.51) (-2.18) (-3.14) (2.48) 
Exch -0.268** -0.173 -0.475 0.584 
 (-2.38) (-0.73) (-0.52) (1.08) 
Infl -0.317 -0.215* -0.193* 0.430 
 (-0.44) (-1.78) (-1.71) (0.81) 
Retn 0.176* 0.224** 0.292*** -0.362*** 
 (1.74) (2.33) (2.74) (-2.98) 
TOPNS 0.383 0.302** 0.236** -0.253*** 
 (0.52) (2.16) (2.48) (-5.18) 
GDPPC 0.393* 0.527 0.24 0.276* 
 (1.81) (1.48) (0.88) (1.68) 
MKTCap 0.790*** 0.164*** 0.667*** -0.167** 
 (3.72) (3.66) (3.22) (-2.25) 
R_Law 0.134*** 0.429*** 0.302*** -0.642*** 
 (4.23) (8.23) (8.53) (-5.15) 
Legal_O 0.461*** 0.572*** 0.186*** -0.387*** 
 (4.70) (3.46) (3.40) (-3.62) 
FinRisk -0.545 -0.134** -0.552 0.531** 
 (-1.52) (-1.96) (-0.78) (2.28) 
Cor -0.326** -0.423* -0.210 0.259** 
 (-1.95) (-1.72) (-0.108) (2.57) 
Constant 2.108** -2.075* 0.353 3.564*** 
 (2.47) (-1.82) (0.67) (7.97) 
Number of Observations 589 589 589 562 
Adj. R-squared 
Country effects 
0.51 
Yes 
0.48 
Yes 
0.43 
Yes 
0.26 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4: Foreign bias (global fund) and stock market development 
 
This table reports the estimates of four different regression specifications of the following general equation (11).  
 
𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐹_𝐹𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝟐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡        (11) 
 
The dependent variables in each of the four specifications are the four different measures of stock market 
development (𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑗𝑡), i.e. MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST respectively, as defined in the notes to Table 1. 
The key explanatory variable, GF_FB, is also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are defined 
in the notes to Table 2. 𝛼𝑗 denotes country fixed effects and 𝛿𝑡 is year fixed effects. The t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors double clustered at the country and year levels.  For tractable 
interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
 
 Model (1) 
MGDP 
Model (2) 
TRGDP 
Model (3) 
TURN 
Model (4) 
TRCOST 
GF_FB 0.115** 0.408*** 0.334*** -0.127*** 
 (2.06) (3.68) (3.25) (-4.16) 
FDIS 0.183*** 0.096** 0.108*** -0.138*** 
 (3.94) (2.33) (4.18) (-2.83) 
Sav 0.672* 0.842 0.332 0.514 
 (1.69) (1.30) (0.77) (0.32)** 
PCred 0.784*** 0.156*** 0.545** -2.204 
 (3.55) (3.48) (2.37) (-1.36) 
Int -0.147 -0.244*** -0.248*** 0.114*** 
 (-0.48) (-3.05) (-3.72) (3.88) 
Exch -0.213* -0.153 -0.133 0.171 
 (-1.96) (-0.75) (-0.94) (0.36) 
Infl -0.533 -1.570 -1.123 0.367 
 (-1.07) (-1.29) (-1.00) (0.70) 
Retn 0.491* 0.173* 0.246*** -0.548* 
 (1.84) (1.96) (3.24) (-1.77) 
TOPNS 0.635 0.365 0.108 -0.172*** 
 (0.72) (0.22) (1.24) (-2.68) 
GDPPC 0.113 0.153 0.195 0.383** 
 (0.58) (0.66) (0.89) (2.20) 
MKTCap 0.796*** 0.171*** 0.762*** -0.241** 
 (3.78) (4.58) (3.71) (-2.27) 
R_Law 0.144*** 0.335*** 0.187*** -0.725*** 
 (6.52) (9.12) (6.83) (-6.43) 
Legal_O 0.367*** 0.379** 0.137*** -0.156** 
 (3.80) (2.42) (3.27) (-2.23) 
FinRisk -0.124 -0.326 -0.135 -0.495 
 (-0.57) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.33) 
Cor -0.365** -0.438* -0.148 0.336*** 
 (-2.18) (-1.76) (-0.82) (3.31) 
Constant 1.906** -2.145* 0.454 3.325*** 
 (2.23) (-1.76) (0.63) (7.19) 
Number of Observations 589 589 589 562 
Adj. R-squared 
Country effects 
0.45 
Yes 
0.48 
Yes 
0.37 
Yes 
0.56 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
 35 
 
Table 5: Robustness checks 
 
This table reports the estimates of four different specifications of general equation number 12 
as reported in the text. The dependent variables in each of the two specifications are the 
measures of stock market development i.e. MGDP, TRGDP, TURN and TRCOST as defined in 
the notes to Table 1. The key explanatory variables are shock based interactive variable (𝐺𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡) generated using the recent 2007 global financial crises (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) as 
the exogenous shock which affected the home and foreign biases measures (𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡) of of the 
most severely affected countries 𝐺𝑡 (treatment group) relative to the control group (least 
affected countries). We classify the treatment and control groups using the measure of market 
capitalization to GDP. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
double clustered at the country and year levels. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients 
are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
 
 
 
Shock Based Identification (equation 12, please see the text) 
𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  × CPIS_HB -0.213***  -0.379*** -0.193*** 0.228*** 
 (-2.87) (-3.56) (-3.72) (2.88) 
𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  × CPIS_FB   0.262** 0.392*** 0.317*** -0.690** 
 (2.14) (2.77) (2.95) (-2.03) 
𝐺𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  × GF_FB 0.274***  0.406*** 0.227*** -0.170*** 
 (2.83) (2.78) (3.51) (3.46) 
Controls including country and 
year fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Figure 1: Yearly home bias in LAFC and MAFC countries 
 
Notes: This graph shows the yearly average home bias measure (i.e. tendency of domestic portfolio investors to over- or under-
allocate their own domestic market relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for the MAFC and the LAFC countries. The objective 
is to gauge how the MAFC countries experienced an increase in their home bias proxy compared to LAFC countries during 
the 2007 global financial crises. 
 
 
Figure 2: Yearly foreign bias in LAFC and MAFC countries 
 
Notes:  This graph shows the yearly average foreign bias measure (i.e. tendency of foreign portfolio investors to over- or 
under-allocate a non-resident country relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for the MAFC and the LAFC countries. The objective 
is to gauge how the MAFC countries suffered a decline in their foreign bias proxy compared to LAFC countries during the 
2007 global financial crises. We rescale foreign bias to 1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝐵 which now shows the absence of foreign bias if the value 
is one. Therefore, a value greater than one suggests higher foreign bias and a value less than one indicates a lower foreign bias. 
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